STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

THE RIFT BETWEEN THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND THE ACTIVE ARMY

BY

COLONEL JAMES F. HESSE
United States Army National Guard

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

USAWC CLASS OF 1998



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

19980520 063

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

The Rift Between the Army National Guard and the Active Army

by

Colonel James F. Hesse

Colonel Kenneth D. Chrosniak
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel James F. Hesse

TITLE: The Rift Between the Army National Guard and the Active Army

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 1 April 1998 PAGES: 42 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The results of the recent Quadrennial Defense Review and growing competition for declining resources have greatly exacerbated the historically uneasy relationship between the Army National Guard and the active Army. This paper explores the historical precedents and reasons for the ongoing tension between the Army components, and highlights the events leading to the current rift. Personal interviews and experiences, an Army War College Class of 1998 Total Force Survey, and published sources provide the basis for recommendations to resolve the dysfunctional relationship between the active Army and the Army National Guard.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT iii

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS 3

KEY EVENTS LEADING TO THE CURRENT RIFT 6

ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE STUDY 11

INTERVIEWS 11

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE CLASS OF 1998 TOTAL FORCE POLICY SURVEY . 14

INTEREST GROUPS 18

RECOMMENDATIONS 22

SUMMARY 27

APPENDIX 29

ENDNOTES 39

BIBLIOGRAPHY 41

THE RIFT BETWEEN THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND THE ACTIVE ARMY

"At the high end of responding to crises is fighting and winning major theater wars. This mission will remain the ultimate test of our *Total Force*--our active and reserve military components--and one in which it must always succeed."[1]

The institution of the Total Force Policy, over 25 years ago, has significantly impacted the roles, missions, force structures and end strengths of the active and reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces. Recent unprecedented peacetime callups and deployments of Reservists confirm the realities of today's Total Force Policy. The United States Armed Forces are no longer structured, nor can they deploy, to execute our National Military Strategy without the National Guard and Reserves.

Growing competition for declining resources and the results of the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) have greatly exacerbated the historically uneasy relationship between the active Army and the Army National Guard. Although the other services, most notably the Air Force, have apparently adopted the Total Force Policy, the Army continues to struggle with the concept. Despite the prudent need to foster a cohesive "Total Army" effort to execute the Army's portion of the National Military Strategy in a constrained resourcing environment, the current relationship between the active Army and Army National Guard can be described as tenuous at best. Retired Major General

Edward Philbin, Executive Director of the National Guard Association of the United States, recently stated, "There can be no greater division between the Army National Guard and the active Army than now exists."[2]

The thesis of this paper is that peacetime control of the Guard by the Governors, poorly understood cultural differences, and a general lack of active Army leadership knowledge and understanding of the Army National Guard, are perpetuating the current tension between the two components. Further, prejudices and parochial interests of several competing groups continue to breed mistrust and disharmony between the active Army and the Army National Guard.

The key to resolving this dysfunctional relationship, and establishing a common bond of trust, is to enhance significantly interrelations between the two components, replacing misconception and misperception with factual knowledge and informed opinion. In addition, the parochial interests of the several competing groups involved must be recognized and mediated or arbitrated by an objective party.

This paper will briefly explore the historical precedents for the ongoing acrimonious relationship between the active Army and the Army National Guard, and highlight the key events leading to the current rift. Personal interviews and experiences, a survey administered to the Army War College Class of 1998, and

published sources will substantiate the thesis of this paper and provide the basis for the offered recommendations.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

States' sovereignty versus a strong central government, the underlying concerns of a potential threat to freedoms just won from the British Crown, and the economics of maintaining a peacetime standing Army, expansible in times of war or national emergency, were the primary issues confronting our Founding Fathers during the debate and adoption of what has been the foundation of our Nation's defense establishment for over two centuries.[3]

The Congressional compromise of the Militia Clause of the Constitution, and the subsequent passage of the Uniformed Militia Act of 1792, ensured states' sovereignty by "...reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."[4] The second amendment to the Constitution further addressed the concerns of potential abuse from a standing federal Army by providing for "...a well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."[5]

The compromise also authorized the militia as an economical means to address the concerns of the costs regarding resourcing a peacetime standing Army. Congress further ensured that the militia would be available in times of war or national emergency by reserving the power to call "... forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, surpress insurrections and repel invasions."[6] In keeping with the constitutional philosophy of the separation and balance of powers, command of the militia when in federal service was delegated to the Executive Branch by stipulating: "The President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the Militia of the several states when called into the actual service of the United States..."[7]

Peacetime authority and control of the militia (National Guard) by the Governors of the States and Territories has consistently been a point of contention with the leadership of the active Army. Over the years, this issue has led to several attempts by the active Army to eliminate the National Guard and replace it with a federal reserve strictly under the command and control of the active Army.[8] The dual chain-of-command of the National Guard is likely the most important reason for the historically uneasy relationship between the active Army and the Army National Guard.

The active military culture recognizes only one "chain of command" and allegiance to one commander, whereas the Guard has a

dual chain-of-command. The senior leadership of the Army is accustomed to its decisions and orders being strictly followed and is not wont to being countermanded by the political influence wielded by the Governors should a decision be possibly detrimental to the Guard. A recent comment by an active Army officer eloquently sums up this point, "When the Chief of Staff of the Army makes a decision on what is best for the Army, why don't you Guard guys just salute and follow orders?"

In a democratic society, unlike the military, majority rules. Our system of checks and balances have served us well for over 200 years to ensure that the power of the few cannot easily be abused. The National Guard is a part of our peacetime system of checks and balances that ensures decisions made by the few in authority are in the best interests of the American citizen.

Although not without problems, the Uniformed Militia Act of 1792 would remain substantially unchanged for 111 years until it was modified by Congressional passage of the Dick Act in 1903, and subsequent amendment in 1908, which strengthened federal control over the National Guard. It is interesting to note that throughout our nation's history, most of the significant military reform has been legislated by Congress within a few years of a major war.[9] Although Congress did not significantly legislate reform for the services immediately after the Vietnam War, the Department of Defense, then under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, implemented the "Total Force Policy" to

ensure that the United States would never again go to war without the National Guard and Reserves thus ensuring the support of the American people.

Demands after each war to capture the "peace dividend," thereby drastically reducing active Army end strength and force structure, have led to peaks of acrimony between the active Army and the Army National Guard as each competed for declining resources and their existence.[10] Political support by the Governors and Congress has ensured that the Guard has remained competitive with the active Army during the resourcing battles after each war. The current rift between the active Army and the Army National Guard can be attributed directly to the ending of the Cold War and subsequent competition for continually declining resources.

KEY EVENTS LEADING TO THE CURRENT RIFT

The current rift between the active Army and the Army National Guard did not happen overnight, but rather through a series of events that have led to the current impasse. If one were to identify three key events that led to this crisis, they would be the following:

1. Failure of the Army to deploy the Roundout Brigades for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

2. Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan's 1992 testimony to Congress that, in his opinion, it would take 365 days to get a National Guard combat division ready for combat.[11]

3. The results of the Quadrennial Defense Review and subsequent "off-site" negotiation among the active Army, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell's base force plans to reduce the active Army, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves by at least 25% were already on the drawing board before Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.[12] The active Army stood to lose six of its eighteen combat divisions, and the Guard had begun to inactivate two of its ten divisions. With the Cold War over, many in the active Army at that time feared that the planned loss of six active Army divisions could go higher still.

Failure to callup and deploy the Army National Guard Roundout Brigades at the beginning of Operation DESERT SHIELD was the first "volley" of what has led to the current peak of acrimony between the Army National Guard and the active Army. Most in the Guard continue to believe that the reason the Roundout Brigades were not deployed is because the success of the brigades in the desert of Iraq would have threatened further cuts to the active Army combat divisions.

The second "volley" leading to the current rift was when then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan testified before Congress that it would take 365 days to get an Army National Guard combat division ready to deploy. During the Cold War, and immediately prior to General Sullivan's testimony, Guard divisions were to be available for deployment in 60-90 days, or fewer. General Sullivan's testimony took even his own staff by surprise. However, it took only a couple of days for the Army staff to change the planning figures to reflect that it would now take 365 days to ready a Guard division for combat. Again, the Guard saw this as a further attempt by the active Army to discredit the Guard's combat capability in order to justify retaining active Army combat structure.

The straw that broke the camel's back was the outcome of the Quadrennial Defense Review, which, to the surprise of the Guard leadership, called for 38,000 personnel cuts to the Army National Guard and also questioned the relevancy of the Guard's combat divisions. When two very senior General Officers of the Army staff briefed the 54 Adjutants General on the recommended Quadrennial Defense Review cuts shortly after they were announced, the Adjutants General openly questioned the decision. In response, one of the senior active Army briefers stated, "If you have a problem with the decision, take it up with your chain-of-command."

Little did that senior active Army General Officer realize what the implications would be to his comment to the Adjutants General to use their chain-of-command. Within two weeks of that meeting, President Clinton and Secretary of Defense Cohen had personally heard from 45 of the 54 Governors of the States and Territories, expressing their concerns on the proposed cuts to the Army National Guard.

In response to the Governors' concerns, Secretary of Defense Cohen directed the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army to resolve the Quadrennial Defense Review personnel reduction issues with the Army National Guard prior to his upcoming scheduled testimony to Congress. An "off-site" meeting was immediately scheduled to negotiate an agreement on the proposed cuts. Co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the "off-site" was attended by senior active Army General Officer principal staff and senior General Officer representatives from the National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve.

After almost three days of intense negotiation, an apparent agreement on the cuts, which were tied to the active Army's acceptance of "11 principles" submitted by the Guard, was reached among the three parties, who reported success to Secretary Cohen. However, although the Guard leaders thought they had a firm negotiated agreement, it is now apparent that no agreement exists. The active Army leadership currently states that they

only agreed to the "11 principles" as goals, and are not obligated to take specific actions to adopt the principles.

Secretary Cohen has placed further pressures on the active Army leadership to resolve the differences between the active Army and the Army National Guard. In a strongly worded memorandum, Secretary Cohen issued guidance to the Service Secretaries, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Combatant Commanders to address the situation.[13] In addition, General Shalikashvili, in his last days as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was reportedly working on a solution to the problem.[14]

The Chief of Staff of the Army has recently initiated meetings with the Adjutants General to open lines of communication, but to date there is no evidence of any resolution of the issues. Additionally, in recent weeks, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations have written rebuttals favorable to the Guard in response to editorials critical of the Guard. These are positive signs that an effort is being made to publicly mend fences; however, actions speak louder than words and the Guard leadership has not seen any evidence of actions being taken by the active Army to resolve the issues. With neither side willing to compromise at this time, it is apparent that the current impasse will not be settled unless the issues are mediated or arbitrated by an objective representative of the Secretary of Defense.

When the active Army and the Guard have not been able to reach agreement to issues in the past, Congress has stepped in to legislate a solution. Current Congressional interest is apparent as evidenced by a recently proposed legislative attempt to elevate the position of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to four stars and place him on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE STUDY

A study conducted by the United States Army Research Institute in 1988 identified cultural differences between the Guard and active Army and observes that

> ...the citizen soldier seeks to serve *first*, and if called upon, to *defend*. ...[A] more humanistic perspective of the citizen-soldier's role also emerged in the sense of a strong desire to serve one's neighbors and community--not simply a "job", but rather a calling.[15]

The study goes on to state

> ...the active component and the Guard and Reserves are, indeed, *one* culture, albeit, with attendant subcultures. Thus, a Total Force Policy is, indeed, viable if all parties concerned make a concerted effort to end the rivalry and focus on building and strengthening their relationships. What is needed is better education of the active component leadership at all levels in terms of the Guard, its strengths as well as its weaknesses.[16]

INTERVIEWS

Several nonattribution interviews were conducted with senior Army National Guard General Officers, Department of the Army

Civilians, and active Army, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve Army War College students. Interviews were conducted to better define the major issues and cultural barriers affecting the current strained relationship and to note any progress being made to date.

In interviews with active Army War College students, a common trait was consistently identified. Those that had not served in a reserve component duty assignment had little factual knowledge of the roles, missions and organization of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve.

The active Army officers interviewed, who have had reserve component duty assignments, spoke very highly of their experiences and the Total Force Policy. Upon notification that they had been selected for a reserve component duty assignment, they indicated that the first thing that came to their minds was "What did I do wrong?" followed by the assumption that their active Army careers were over. All related that the general perception is that assignment to one of the three R's (recruiting, ROTC or reserve components) is a career stopper. Fortunately, all were part of a special program to provide high quality support to the reserve components and their careers were not affected.

Many stated that prior to their assignments they also had the perception that most reserve component officers were failures on active duty, and thus were of lesser quality than their active

duty counterparts. They further related that this perception was rapidly dispelled after working with their Guard and Reserve counterparts.

One active Army officer stated that he had just come from the 82nd Airborne Division, and continuously thought in terms of hours to be on the ramp for deployment, with the goal that one always needs to be prepared for combat. He further stated that it took some time to understand, that for the most part, the Guard and Reserves do not think in terms of hours for deployment for combat, but relate more to days or, perhaps, weeks. Thus, with the exception of combat units, most placed more importance on "mission preparedness" versus "combat readiness." His further realization that the potential is greater for the Guard to be called-up to respond immediately to a domestic crisis than to deploy for combat put the priorities for "mission preparedness" in perspective.

Another active Army officer offered that he noted distinct cultural differences between the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve. He stated that he had to prove himself and build trust with the Army National Guard units he worked with, whereas, he was much more readily accepted by U.S. Army Reserve units. He further noted that the Army National Guard is more community and service oriented, and its members identify themselves as Guardsmen, whereas, Reservists are more apt to identify with the active Army, and not necessarily with the U.S. Army Reserve. The

culture of a Guardsman is that he is a citizen first, and a soldier who follows orders when he is called to duty. Whereas, for the most part, active Army personnel see themselves first as soldiers who follow orders, and secondly as citizens.

Some of the current acrimony may also be attributed to the perceptions that existed during the draft and Vietnam War that the Guard was a haven for those avoiding being sent to fight. Most of the current senior leadership of the active Army are Vietnam veterans who may still harbor some anti-Guard sentiment from their early career experiences during the Vietnam era.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE CLASS OF 1998 TOTAL FORCE POLICY SURVEY

A "Total Force" survey was administered on November 20, 1997, to the Army War College Class of 1998. The purpose of the survey was to ascertain the perceptions, attitudes and factual knowledge of future senior leaders of the United States Armed Forces on the current status of the implementation and execution of the Total Force Policy and its relationship to our National Military Strategy. The majority of the questions asked were centered on the active Army and its relationship with the Army National Guard.

The class response rate was 59%. A summary of the respondents and supporting data for each question is provided in the appendix. It should be noted that the survey results were

not influenced by the National Defense Panel Report, which was released after the survey was administered.

The 30 question survey was designed to provide quantifiable data to support or rebut the following theses:

1. That there currently exists a distinct divergence of opinion and attitude between the "field" and the senior leadership of the Army on several key issues regarding the roles, missions and capabilities of the reserve components of the Army.

2. That the active component's factual knowledge of the roles, missions, organization and capabilities of the reserve components is limited, especially in the Army.

The survey provided strong quantifiable data to support these theses. Consistently, nearly two-thirds of the class are highly supportive of the current Total Force Policy and acknowledge the importance of the reserve components to support our National Military Strategy. Although a significant majority are highly supportive, one has to be concerned about the approximately one-third of the respondents who apparently are not.

Highlights of the survey results include:

- 67% of the total respondents do not believe that our current National Military Strategy of maintaining and sustaining a military capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars is viable.

- 83% of the respondents believe that maintaining and sustaining a smaller, highly ready, active duty force is more acceptable than maintaining a larger, but less ready active duty force. It is obvious from the response to this statement that the current policy of maintaining end strength at the expense of readiness is not favored by the "field."

- 83% of the respondents do not believe the Army can successfully execute our current National Military Strategy without reliance on Army National Guard combat divisions. The current senior active Army leadership position is that the Army National Guard divisions are not needed to execute our National Military Strategy.

- 72% of the respondents believe it would take less than 180 post mobilization training days to get an Army National Guard combat division ready to deploy for combat. This is in direct contrast to the current active Army senior leadership position that it would take 365 days to get an Army National Guard division "combat ready".

- 80% of the respondents do not believe that the reserve components of the Army are adequately resourced to sustain sufficient readiness levels required to execute our National Military Strategy.

- 68% of the respondents believe that reserve component units are better suited and should be assigned additional

responsibility for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and domestic response missions.

- 58% of the respondents indicated that they believe that the current strained relationship between the active Army and the Army National Guard is a serious problem; however, 53% of the active Army respondents do not believe it is a serious problem. Several active Army respondents offered that the problem is not in the "field," but exists inside the "beltway" at the General Officer level.

- 53% of the total respondents believe that current laws allow adequate federal access to the reserve components to respond in a timely manner to operational requirements of the services. However, 58% of the active Army respondents do not believe that the current laws are adequate.

- 62% of the respondents believe that the Army National Guard is primarily a State force, whereas, the U.S. Army Reserve is the Federal Reserve of the Army. The response to this one question alone indicates how much misconception currently exists about the roles and missions of the Army National Guard.

- 45% of active Army respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement that military and civilian education requirements for promotion of reserve officers are less than for active duty officers, indicating a high degree of a lack of factual knowledge.

- 75% of active duty respondents indicated that they would welcome an assignment with the reserve components, if career enhancing.

- Although 70% of the respondents indicated that they are confident in their knowledge of the roles, missions, capabilities, organization and functioning of the Reserve components, 25% of the active Army respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement, which indicates such a lack of knowledge as to be unable to form an opinion.

- 90% of the respondents believe that recent, numerous deployments of reservists are creating serious problems with a number of employers, and are affecting the recruiting and retention of reservists. In reality, recent studies by the Personnel Directorate of the National Guard Bureau indicate that recruiting and retention efforts for Army National Guard units that have recently redeployed generally have not been affected, but in some cases have been enhanced.

- 84% of the respondents indicate they would welcome a one- to two-week orientation with a Reserve component unit to learn first hand how they are organized and how they train.

INTEREST GROUPS

To the casual observer, and according to press accounts, it would appear that the current rift is strictly between the active Army and the Army National Guard. In reality, there are several

competing groups, many with interests that benefit from continuing the feud. The following are several competing groups and identified interests that apparently are affecting resolution of the strained relationship.

1. The 54 Governors, Adjutants General of the States and Territories and the National Guard Bureau. The primary interests of this group include: sufficient force structure, end strength, General Officer positions, rank structure, command and control, modern equipment, and resources and full-time employees to sustain the readiness and capability to fight and win our Nation's wars and to respond effectively to state and national emergencies. In addition to these primary interests is the retention of the Guard's historical combat maneuver mission, which directly competes with the active Army's interests.

2. The senior leadership of the active Army. The primary interests of this group include: retaining primacy of the combat maneuver mission by retaining a maximum number of active duty combat divisions, force structure, end strength, General Officer positions, rank structure, command and control, and modern equipment and resources to sustain the readiness and capability to fight and win our nation's wars. The interests of the active Army leadership are almost identical to the Guard leadership and are in direct competition.

3. The senior leadership of the U.S. Army Reserve. The U.S. Army Reserve has many of the same competing interests as the

Guard and the active Army, with one distinct exception. The U.S. Army Reserve is not competing, nor does it pose a threat to, the active Army's combat divisions. In return for political support, the U.S. Army Reserve has been "protected" somewhat by the active Army in the recent negotiations for personnel cuts. For example, the Quadrennial Defense Review called for a 7,000 personnel reduction to the U.S. Army Reserve versus 38,000 to the Army Guard. In addition, the U.S. Army Reserve, unlike the Guard, does not have a dual chain-of-command, and has little recourse but to follow "orders" of the decisions made by the senior active Army staff. However, the U.S. Army Reserve is in direct competition with the Guard for resources, and it is to their advantage for the rift to continue.

4. The lobbyist groups, such as the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) and the Reserve Officers Association (ROA). These groups' interests include: membership, welfare and benefits of members, policy issues affecting force structure, end strength, resources, equipment, roles and missions and contractor interests. Although membership of the AUSA and ROA includes Guard officers, the AUSA generally represents the interests of the active Army, the ROA the interests of the U.S. Army Reserve and the NGAUS the interests of the National Guard.

5. Officers, Noncommissioned Officers and soldiers of all of the components. The interests of this group include: upward

mobility, benefits, quality of life, modern equipment, job security and sufficient resources to fight and win our nation's wars, and to respond effectively to national and domestic emergencies.

6. Contractors, whose interests are profit motivated.

7. Congress, whose interests include: reelection as a result of representing the wishes of the majority of the American taxpayers. Their primary interests are usually focused on issues relating to respective Committee memberships.

8. Department of the Army Civilians. The interests of this group include: job security, benefits, and upward mobility. These interests can be directly correlated to resistance to change.

9. Retirees of all of the components. Interests of this group are centered on benefits, and identification with a historical culture which promotes resistance to change. The retired former senior leadership of the active Army, or "Grey Beards," seemingly have great influence on the actions of the current senior active Army leadership. It is generally believed by the Guard that the "Grey Beards" are negatively affecting resolution of the current rift.

10. The senior leadership of the other services. All of the services are competing for declining resources, and political disunity of the Army benefits the other services.

The common interest of the above noted groups should be to maintain an efficient force balance that can win our nation's wars and execute our National Military Strategy while retaining the full capability to respond effectively to any domestic or national emergency.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is evident that a negotiated agreement to settle the rift is not in the offing due to the results of the last "off-site" meeting and corresponding lack of trust that exists between the current senior Guard and active Army leadership. Although dialog has taken place between the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Adjutants General, specific actions to resolve the issues have not occurred. With neither side willing to compromise, especially after the Guard leadership believed they had an agreement, it is a reasonable prediction that the impasse will continue until outside mediation and arbitration occurs. If these fail, the decisions will be left to Congress, as has historically been the case.

Recommend the following:

1. That the Secretary of Defense initiate and lead a forum to open a regularly scheduled dialog with all of the interest groups noted above. To ensure success, the forum must be chaired by a totally objective civilian who is empowered to speak and act directly for the Secretary of Defense. The current rift cannot

be rectified if one of the interest groups is chairing the dialog. It is also extremely important that the Chairperson have their disposal highly skilled mediators who can facilitate the process.

2. That the Secretary of Defense ensure that parochial agendas are set aside, and that issues and disagreements are mediated and resolved behind closed doors vice debated openly in public and the press.

3. That mediated agreements or arbitrated settlements reached are followed by timely actions. Although not all constituents of the respective interest groups will be satisfied with any agreement or settlement reached, timely action to implement the agreements will ensure that a lessor degree of second guessing will occur. It is obvious that negotiations among three of the interest groups (active Army, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve) have previously failed, because of the inability to immediately implement agreements.

4. That a military to military "Partnership for Peace" program be initiated between the active Army and the Army National Guard. Although it is evidently too late for current senior leaders of the active Army and the Army National Guard to benefit from many of the following recommended solutions, greater interrelations and integration must be promoted to bind the Total Army together for the future. Key to attaining a seamless Army must start with the following objectives:

- Replace prejudice and perception with informed opinion.

- Build trust and confidence through education, cultural understanding and personal relationships.

- Promote greater interoperability through enhanced integration and interrelations.

5. That all active duty officers in the grade of Colonel and below who have been selected for promotion, attend a one- to two-week orientation with the Army National Guard in conjunction with their next permanent change of station (PCS) move. Priority initially should go to combat arms officers.

The orientations should consist of a tour of a Guard state headquarters with briefings on structure, roles, missions, capabilities, and training, etc. Orientations should also include attendance at a weekend drill and, where possible, attendance with a unit during its two-week annual training.

6. That CAPSTONE and Roundout programs be reinstituted to form a bond of trust and understanding between active Army and reserve component units. The CAPSTONE program, which was discontinued immediately after Operation DESERT STORM, aligned reserve component units with their active Army warplans gaining command and formed effective habitual working relationships. Reserve component units received training guidance and participated in exercises and training events with their designated wartime gaining command. The Roundout concept, which was also discontinued after Operation DESERT STORM, consisted of

"rounding out" the third brigade of selected active Army divisions with an Army National Guard brigade. This program should be expanded to include reserve component battalions "rounding out" active Army brigades.

7. That the Chief of Staff of the Army make it a matter of policy that innuendo and disparaging remarks about reserve component members or units will not be tolerated. The philosophy of the "Consideration of Others" program should be expanded to include the reserve component members of the Army, as well as women and minorities.

8. That the active Army accept ownership and responsibility for reserve component collective unit training readiness. Active Army wartime gaining commands should have a vested interest in the wartime mission preparedness of its reserve component units.

9. That legislation be enacted by Congress to allow a reserve component duty assignment to be accepted in lieu of the current requirement for a "Joint" duty assignment for active Army officer promotion to General Officer. This proposal would help to dispel the current perception that a reserve component duty assignment is a "career stopper." It would also ensure that the reserve component receives the high quality active Army assistance and attention that it requires.

10. That the Key Personnel Upgrade Program (KPUP) be funded and reinstituted. This program allowed reserve component individuals to fill active Army personnel shortfalls for

relatively short periods of time, usually from two to four weeks. Recommend this program also include the opportunity for active Army personnel to fill reserve component personnel shortfalls during two week annual training periods.

11. That the active Army accept greater Guard General Officer and Colonel representation on the Department of the Army General Staff.

12. That a Title 32 Active Guard Reserve (AGR) and active Army exchange program be initiated to allow a two-year duty exchange of assignments of Guard and Reserve personnel at active Army MACOMS such as CONUSAs, FORSCOM, etc. In exchange, active Army personnel should be assigned to Guard State Headquarters and units for the same amount of time. This program should be a one for one exchange.

13. That the Chief of Staff of the Army publicly heal the wounds caused by the misconception that still persists as to the mobilization of the Guard Roundout Brigades during Operation DESERT STORM. The common perception of the active Army - "They weren't ready - so they didn't deploy," is inaccurate, misleading and is self perpetuated. Public acknowledgment by the senior leadership of the active Army as to what really happened to the Roundout Brigades during Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM would be a great stride in building the trust that is required to mend the existing broken bond between the Army National Guard and the active Army.

SUMMARY

To effectively and finally resolve the existing acrimonious relationship between the active Army and Army National Guard will require a dedicated commitment from all of the noted interest groups. Anything less will not improve relations. Much of the current acrimony is being caused by the active Army's lack of understanding and factual knowledge of the Guard's culture, organization, and capabilities. Increasing interrelations between the components would provide expanded knowledge and understanding of the Guard.

All those active Army officers interviewed who have had reserve component duty assignments expressed a very positive attitude and respect for the Guard and Reserves. These officers likewise understand the dual chain-of-command and subtle cultural differences of the Guard, and have further acquired a firm foundation of knowledge to form opinions based on facts, rather than the perceptions and misconceptions that are usually the basis for much of the active Army's opinions of both the Guard and U.S. Army Reserve.

Probably the toughest issue to settle will be the roles and missions of the two components, specifically, how many active Army and Guard combat divisions will remain in the force structure. However, today's world is still a dangerous place.

There are more than enough missions for the Total Army to be focused on to deter aggression and make the world a safer place now and for the future.

(Word Count: 5984)

APPENDIX

Results of U.S. Army War College Class of 1998

Total Force Survey

Attached is the Total Force survey that was administered to the Army War College Class of 1998. Included is a brief synopsis of the survey results. The survey was administered on 20 November 1997 prior to the release of the National Defense Panel Report.

Of the 266 surveys that were distributed, 156 (59%) were returned. International Fellows of the class were not included in the survey results.

Survey Respondent Profile:

98 Active Duty Army

11 Army National Guard

9 U.S. Army Reserve

1 Air National Guard

12 Active Duty Air Force

1 Air Force Reserve

8 Civilians

11 Active Duty Navy

4 Marine Corps

1 Coast Guard

Scoring Survey Responses

Percentages used to score agreement or disagreement with the first 22 statements presented in the survey are derived by tabulating only those that scored the questions 1 or 2 (disagree) or 4 or 5 (agree). The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Question Construction Manual states, "When working with paired comparison items with a "No preference" option, the "No preference" responses can often be either divided proportionate to the preference responses, or disregarded altogether."[17]

Respondents scoring the first 22 questions "3" indicate neutrality which may be from a lack of knowledge on the subject. Another reason for a respondent to score a statement "3" is that the individual does not care strongly enough about the subject to agree or disagree. Based on the audience and interests of each of the respondents, it likely that those scoring a statement "3" do not have enough knowledge about the subject to have formed an opinion.

Following each question in bold type is a brief synopsis of the results of the survey.

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
STUDENT SURVEY

The institution of the Total Force Policy, almost 25 years ago, has directly impacted on the roles, missions, resourcing, force structure and end strength of both the active and reserve components of the respective services. To gain a better appreciation of how our current Total Force Policy is perceived as part of my SRP research, I would greatly appreciate your assistance by taking a few minutes to complete this survey. Any additional written comments would also be sincerely appreciated. **PLEASE RETURN COMPLETED SURVEY TO BOX 151 NLT 1 DECEMBER 1, 1997.** Thank you in advance! Colonel Jim Hesse.

Please Circle One of Each of Following Regarding your status:

Service:	**Component:**	**Branch:**
Army	Active	Combat
Navy	National Guard	Combat Support
Air Force	Reserve	Combat Service Support
Marines	Civilian	Other_____
Other _____	International Fellow	Not applicable

STRONGLY DISAGREE	**DISAGREE**	**NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE**	**AGREE**	**STRONGLY AGREE**
1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**

Based on the above scale, please circle the number which best describes your reaction to each of the following statements.

1. The active services should be structured and resourced to not rely on reserve units and individuals to respond to contingency missions. **1 2 3 4 5**

71% of the respondents disagreed with the above statement which indicates a significant majority of the AWC Class of 98 support the Total Force Policy. However, although a majority, a lesser percentage (59%) of Active Army Combat Arms students disagreed with the above statement. (Mean - 2.37)

2. The draft should be reinstituted. **1 2 3 4 5**

Interestingly, only a slight majority (55%) of the class disagreed with the above statement. Several commented that although a draft was not favored, mandatory public service, which would include military service for all 18 year olds, is highly recommended. (Mean - 2.70)

3. Current laws allow adequate access to the reserve components to respond in a timely manner to operational requirements of the services. **1 2 3 4 5**

Although a slight majority of the class (53%) agreed that current laws allow adequate access to the reserve components, 58% of the Active Army respondents disagreed with the above statement. A high percentage (21%) of the Active Army respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the above statement, which may indicate that they did not have sufficient knowledge to have formed an opinion. (Mean - 3.08)

4. The reserve components use resources which are best applied to sustaining active component readiness. **1 2 3 4 5**

68% of the respondents disagreed that the reserve components use resources which would be better applied to sustaining active component readiness. 26% of the Active Army respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the above statement. (Mean - 2.66)

5. The current National Military Strategy of maintaining and sustaining a military capability to successfully fight and win two nearly simultaneous MTW's is viable. **1 2 3 4 5**

Two-thirds (67%) of the AWC Class of 98 do not believe that our current National Military Strategy is viable. An even higher percentage (72%) of the Active Army respondents disagreed with the above statement. (Mean 2.52)

6. Based on current and forecasted Department of Defense budget allocations, there are sufficient resources to carry out the National Military Strategy with acceptable risk. **1 2 3 4 5**

Only 27% of the respondents believe that there are sufficient resources allocated to carry out the NMS with acceptable risk. Only 19% of the Active Army respondents agreed with the above statement. (Mean - 2.45)

7. Given current Department of Defense budget constraints, greater efficiencies can be gained by placing more reliance on the reserve components. **1 2 3 4 5**

A slight majority of the respondents (54%) agreed that greater efficiencies can be gained by placing more reliance on the reserve components. However, 58% of the Active Army respondents disagreed with the above statement. Again, a high percentage (20%) of the Active Army respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the above statement. (Mean - 3.06)

8. Maintaining and sustaining a smaller, highly ready, active duty force is more acceptable than maintaining a larger but less ready active duty force. **1 2 3 4 5**

An overwhelming majority of the AWC Class of 98 respondents (83%) favor maintaining and sustaining a smaller, highly ready, active duty force vice a larger but less ready active duty force. (Mean - 3.83)

9. The Army today can successfully execute, with acceptable risk, our National Military Strategy without reliance on Army National Guard Combat Divisions. **1 2 3 4 5**

Only 17% of the respondents agreed that the Army can successfully execute our National Military strategy without reliance on the Army National Guard Combat Divisions. (Mean - 2.24)

10. Reserve Component units can attain and sustain appropriate readiness levels required to respond effectively, when needed, to contingency operational requirements. **1 2 3 4 5**

A slight majority of the total respondents (56%) agreed with the above statement. However, although 66% of the active Army combat support and combat service support branch respondents agreed with the above statement, 64% of the active Army combat arms respondents do not believe that Reserve Component units can attain and sustain appropriate readiness levels to respond effectively, when needed, to contingency operational requirements. (Mean - 3.12)

11. Peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and domestic response are proper additional missions for the active forces. **1 2 3 4 5**

67% of the respondents agreed with the above statement. (Mean - 3.52)

12. Reserve Component units are better suited and should be assigned additional responsibility for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and domestic response missions. **1 2 3 4 5**

68% of the respondents agreed with the above statement, however, 27% of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the above statement. (Mean - 3.53)

13. The current strained relationship between the active Army and the Army National Guard is a serious problem. **1 2 3 4 5**

A slight majority of the total respondents (58%) agreed with the above statement. However, a slight majority of the active Army respondents (53%) do not believe that the strained relationship between the Active Army and the Army National Guard is a serious problem. Several respondents wrote that the problems are not in the field but are inside the beltway at the senior General Officer level. (Mean - 3.25)

14. The Army National Guard is primarily a state force, whereas the US Army Reserve is the Federal Reserve of the Army. **1 2 3 4 5**

62% of the respondents agreed with the above statement. (Mean - 3.20)

15. Military and civilian educational requirements for promotion of reserve officers are less than active duty officers. **1 2 3 4 5**

Although 64% of all respondents disagreed with the above statement, 45% of the active Army respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. (Mean - 2.73)

16. Combat maneuver units should reside only in the active component. **1 2 3 4 5**

38% of all respondents and 54% of the active Army combat arms branch respondents believe that combat maneuver units should reside only in the active component. (Mean 2.78)

17. If given the choice, I prefer individual fillers for active duty units vice unit capability from the reserve components. **1 2 3 4 5**

35% of the respondents favor individual fillers over unit capability. (Mean - 2.66)

18. The reserve components of the Army are adequately resourced to sustain sufficient readiness levels required to execute our National Military Strategy. **1 2 3 4 5**

80% of the respondents do not believe that the Reserve Components of the Army are adequately resourced. (Mean - 2.41)

19. If career enhancing, I would welcome an assignment with the Reserve Component of my service. **1 2 3 4 5**

75% of the respondents would welcome an assignment with the Reserve Components if career enhancing. (Mean - 3.54)

20. I am very confident in my knowledge of the roles, missions, capabilities, organization and functioning of the respective reserve component(s) of my service. **1 2 3 4 5**

Although 70% of the total respondents agreed with the above statement, 25% of the Active Army respondents neither agreed or disagreed with the above statement. (Mean - 3.50)

21. Recent numerous deployments of reservists are creating serious problems with a number of employers and are affecting the recruiting and retention of reservists. **1 2 3 4 5**

90% of the respondents agreed with the above statement. (Mean - 3.83)

22. I would welcome the opportunity to serve a 1-2 week orientation with a reserve component unit to obtain first hand knowledge of how they train and are organized. **1 2 3 4 5**

84% of the respondents would welcome an orientation with a Reserve Component unit. (Mean 3.82)

Please circle the best answer to the following questions.

23. My contact with the reserve component(s) of my service can be best described as:

A. Little or None
B. Individuals only
C. Small units and individuals
D. Company sized units and larger
E. Other_____

	% of Total Respondents	% of Active Army Respondents
A.	6.2	6.3
B.	16.9	13.5
C.	25.4	21.9
D.	46.1	53.1
E.	5.4	5.2

24. On an average, how many days does an officer or senior enlisted soldier in the reserves spend training or performing an operational mission(s) on an annual basis?

A. 39 days
B. 50 days
C. 60-90 days
D. Over 90 days
E. Other_____

	% of Total Respondents	% of Active Army Respondents
A.	33.8	37.1
B.	24.6	25.8
C.	24.6	21.3
D.	11.3	11.2
E.	5.7	4.6

25. Which of the following do you believe best describes the reserve component personnel of your respective service?

A. Weekend warriors
B. Part-time soldiers, airmen, sailors or Marines
C. Dedicated, trained, citizen-soldiers, airmen, sailors or Marines
D. Other_____

	% of Total Respondents	% of Active Army Respondents
A.	5.3	3.6
B.	27.3	32.6
C.	62.7	56.8
D.	4.7	7.4

26. How many post mobilization training days do you believe it would take to get an Army National Guard Combat Division ready to deploy for combat?

A. 90-120 days
B. 120-180 days
C. 180-270 days
D. 270-365 days
E. Other_____

	% of Total Respondents	% of Active Army Respondents
A.	**35.2**	**31.6**
B.	**37.3**	**36.8**
C.	**16.9**	**20.0**
D.	**4.9**	**6.3**
E.	**5.7**	**5.3**

27. How many post mobilization training days do you believe it would take to get an Army National Guard Combat Enhanced Brigade ready to deploy for combat?

A. 30-60 days
B. 60-90 days
C. 90-120 days
D. 120-180 days
E. Other_____

	% of Total Respondents	% of Active Army Respondents
A.	**22.5**	**20.5**
B.	**38.7**	**37.9**
C.	**23.2**	**25.3**
D.	**10.7**	**11.6**
E.	**4.9**	**3.7**

28. Which of the following services has the best rapport between the active and reserve component(s) of it's respective service and is closest to being a Total Force?

A. Army
B. Navy
C. Air Force
D. Marine Corps

	% of Total Respondents	% of Active Army Respondents
A.	**3.9**	**5.2**
B.	**2.0**	**2.1**
C.	**73.9**	**75.0**
D.	**20.2**	**17.7**

29. How would you structure your respective reserve component(s) if given the opportunity?

A. A balanced force of combat, combat support, and combat service support units that mirrors the active component with individual fillers as required.
B. Individuals and small unit fillers for the active component only.
C. Combat Support and Combat Service units and individual fillers only.
D. It works fine as now structured
E. Other_____

	% of Total Respondents	% of Active Army Respondents
A.	**32.0**	**28.0**
B.	**5.3**	**6.4**
C.	**33.3**	**39.8**
D.	**17.4**	**12.9**
E.	**12.0**	**12.9**

30. How would you best describe the integration of your respective service reserve component with the active service?

A. Excellent
B. Good
C. Adequate
D. Could be better
E. Poor
F. Other_____

	% of Total Respondents	% of Active Army Respondents
A.	**11.2**	**1.0**
B.	**16.4**	**13.4**
C.	**27.6**	**32.0**
D.	**32.2**	**40.2**
E.	**11.2**	**12.4**
F.	**1.4**	**1.0**

I greatly appreciate your assistance and welcome and encourage any additional comments you might provide. Thank you!

ENDNOTES

[1] A National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997, The White House, 12.

[2] Jonathan S. Landay, "Relations Sour Between Army and Its Guardsmen." Christian Science Monitor, September 24, 1997.

[3] Dave R. Palmer, 1794: America, Its Army, and the Birth of a Nation (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994), 127-33; 205-18.

[4] Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section I.

[5] Amendmends to the Constitution of the United States, Article II.

[6] Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section I.

[7] Ibid., Article II, Section II.

[8] Jim Dan Hill relates several accounts of the Regular Army attempts to replace the National Guard with a Federal Reserve in his book The Minuteman in Peace and War, The Stackpole Company, Harrisburg, PA 1964.

[9] See The Militia's Role in National Defense: A Historical Perspective, Final Report, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 1987 by Major Samuel J. Newland for a descriptive evolution of the legislation affecting Federal control of the National Guard.

[10] John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), 169-83.

[11] Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs, 22 February 1992, 347.

[12] Stephen M. Duncan, Citizen Warriors, America's National Guard and Reserve Forces & the Politics of National Security (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997), 4.

[13] Secretary of Defense William A. Cohen, "Integration of Reserve and Active Components," memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Washington, D.C., 4 September 1997.

[14] Bryan Bender, "Shali Said to Oppose Guard Slot on Joint Staff Panel," Defense Daily, 29 September 1997, 526.

[15] Joseph Galioto, An Analytical Study Describing the Organizational Culture of the Army National Guard and Its Effects on Readiness (Alexander, VA: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, December 1988), 48.

[16] Ibid., 59.

[17] Bettina A. Babbitt, Essex Corporation and Charles O. Nystrom, U.S. Army Research Institute, Questionnaire Construction Manual, Research Product 89-20 (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, June 1989) 209.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Babbitt, Bettina A., and Nystrom, Charles O., Questionnaire Construction Manual, Research Product 89-20. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, June 1989.

Bender, Bryan. "Shali Said to Oppose Guard Slot on Joint Staff Panel." Defense Daily, 29 September 1997, p. 526.

Cohen, William A., Secretary of Defense. "Integration of Reserve and Active Components." Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments. Washington, D.C., 4 September 1997.

Duncan, Stephen M. Citizen Warriors, America's National Guard and Reserve Forces & the Politics of National Security. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997.

Galioto, Joseph, An Analytical Study Describing the Organizational Culture of the Army National Guard and Its Effects on Readiness. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, December 1988.

Hill, Jim Dan. The Minuteman in Peace and War. Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1964.

Landay, Jonathan S. "Relations Sour Between Army and Its Guardsmen." Christian Science Monitor, September 24, 1997.

Mahon, John K. History of the Militia and the National Guard. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983.

Newland, Samuel J. The Militia's Role in National Defense: A Historical Perspective, Final Report. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 1987.

Palmer, Dave R. 1794: America, Its Army, and the Birth of a Nation. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994.

The White House. A National Security Strategy for a New Century. Washington, D.C., May 1997.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs. 22 February 1992.

Wilson, Bernie J., III., ed. The GUARD and RESERVE in the TOTAL FORCE: The First Decade, 1973-1983. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1985.